Implementation in minimax regret equilibrium

This Note studies the problem of implementing social choice correspondences in environments where individuals have doubts about the rationality of their opponents. We postulate the concept of ε-minimax regret as our solution concept and show that social choice correspondences that are Maskin monoton...

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Bibliographic Details
Published inGames and economic behavior Vol. 71; no. 2; pp. 527 - 533
Main Authors Renou, Ludovic, Schlag, Karl H.
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published Duluth Elsevier Inc 01.03.2011
Elsevier
Academic Press
SeriesGames and Economic Behavior
Subjects
Bargaining
Decision analysis
Emotions
Equilibrium models
Equilibrium theory
Game theory
Implementation
Implementation Minimax regret Maskin monotonicity
Maskin monotonicity
Minimax regret
Nash equilibrium
Public choice
Studies
Maskin monotonicity
Minimax regret
Implementation
C72
D71
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Summary:This Note studies the problem of implementing social choice correspondences in environments where individuals have doubts about the rationality of their opponents. We postulate the concept of ε-minimax regret as our solution concept and show that social choice correspondences that are Maskin monotonic and satisfy the no-veto power condition are implementable in ε-minimax regret equilibrium for all ε ∈ [ 0 , 1 ) .
Bibliography:ObjectType-Article-2
SourceType-Scholarly Journals-1
ObjectType-Feature-1
content type line 23
ISSN:0899-8256
1090-2473
DOI:10.1016/j.geb.2010.05.010