Benchmarking information aggregation in experimental markets
Theoretical and experimental literature have provided mixed insights on the ability of financial markets to perfectly aggregate private information into asset prices. We conduct an experiment designed to benchmark information aggregation in markets. In our lab experiment, we randomly assign subjects...
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Published in | Economic inquiry Vol. 59; no. 4; pp. 1500 - 1516 |
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Main Authors | , , |
Format | Journal Article |
Language | English |
Published |
Huntington Beach
Western Economic Association
01.10.2021
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Subjects | |
Online Access | Get full text |
ISSN | 0095-2583 1465-7295 1465-7295 |
DOI | 10.1111/ecin.13010 |
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Summary: | Theoretical and experimental literature have provided mixed insights on the ability of financial markets to perfectly aggregate private information into asset prices. We conduct an experiment designed to benchmark information aggregation in markets. In our lab experiment, we randomly assign subjects to different institutional environments, either a market or a Becker–DeGroot–Marschak mechanism. We find evidence that market interaction is worse for information aggregation. The difference between the two environments is driven by price‐insensitive traders who seem unable to learn from market prices. Price‐sensitive traders, by contrast, learn equally well in both environments. |
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Bibliography: | Correction added on 16 July 2021, after first online publication: Funding information has been included in this version ObjectType-Article-1 SourceType-Scholarly Journals-1 ObjectType-Feature-2 content type line 14 |
ISSN: | 0095-2583 1465-7295 1465-7295 |
DOI: | 10.1111/ecin.13010 |