Memory Recall After “Learning by Doing” and “Learning by Viewing”: Boundary Conditions of an Enactment Benefit

According to common sense, things one has done are remembered better than things done by others that one has observed. On first sight, findings concerning memory for actions appear in line with that preconception: Performed actions ("subject-performed tasks") appear to be remembered partic...

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Bibliographic Details
Published inFrontiers in psychology Vol. 6; p. 1907
Main Authors Steffens, Melanie C., von Stülpnagel, Rul, Schult, Janette C.
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published Switzerland Frontiers Media S.A 17.12.2015
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ISSN1664-1078
1664-1078
DOI10.3389/fpsyg.2015.01907

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Summary:According to common sense, things one has done are remembered better than things done by others that one has observed. On first sight, findings concerning memory for actions appear in line with that preconception: Performed actions ("subject-performed tasks") appear to be remembered particularly well, and better than observed actions ("experimenter-performed tasks"). A closer look, however, reveals important exceptions regarding this enactment effect. The aim of the present paper is critically evaluating the literature that compares memory for performed and observed tasks. In recognition memory, an enactment effect has regularly been observed. In free recall, however, findings depended on the experimental design: When performed and observed actions were intermixed, an enactment effect was typically found. In contrast, in designs where actions were either all performed or all observed, this was rarely the case. We discuss underlying memory processes, potential moderator variables, open questions, and implications.
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Edited by: Andreas B. Eder, University of Würzburg, Germany
This article was submitted to Cognition, a section of the journal Frontiers in Psychology
Reviewed by: Veit Kubik, Stockholm University, Sweden; Julie Earles, Florida Atlantic University, USA
ISSN:1664-1078
1664-1078
DOI:10.3389/fpsyg.2015.01907