Decomposing Trust and Trustworthiness

• Published in: Experimental economics : a journal of the Economic Science Association Vol. 9; no. 3; pp. 193 - 208
• Main Authors: Ashraf, Nava, Bohnet, Iris, Piankov†, Nikita
• Format: Journal Article
• Language: English
• Published: New York Springer 01.09.2006; Springer Nature B.V
• Series: Experimental Economics
• Subjects: Altruism; Attitudes; Behavioral sciences; Behavioural sciences; Between-subjects design; Comparative analysis; Cross-cultural analysis; Cross-cultural experiments; Dictators; Earnings; Economic behaviour; Economics; Expected returns; Experimental economics; Experiments; Game theory; Games; Investment; Kindness; Microeconomics; Preferences; Reciprocity; Risk; Risk assessment; Social preferences; Studies; Trust; Within-subjects design; United States > US; South Africa; Russia; USA
• ISSN: 1386-4157; 1573-6938
• DOI: 10.1007/s10683-006-9122-4

What motivates people to trust and be trustworthy? Is trust solely “calculative,” based on the expectation of trustworthiness, and trustworthiness only reciprocity? Employing a within-subject design, we run investment and dictator game experiments in Russia, South Africa and the United States. Additionally, we measured risk preferences and expectations of return. Expectations of return account for most of the variance in trust, but unconditional kindness also matters. Variance in trustworthiness is mainly accounted for by unconditional kindness, while reciprocity plays a comparatively small role. There exists some heterogeneity in motivation but people behave surprisingly similarly in the three countries studied.