Aversion to norm-breaking: A model

In experimental games, we observe the following phenomena: (1) many subjects cooperate contrary to their material interest, (2) they cooperate in a reciprocal manner, (3) subjects often punish those others who behave unkindly, and (4) previous history usually influences subjects' choices. We pr...

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Bibliographic Details
Published inGames and economic behavior Vol. 64; no. 1; pp. 237 - 267
Main Author López-Pérez, Raúl
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published Duluth Elsevier Inc 01.09.2008
Elsevier
Academic Press
SeriesGames and Economic Behavior
Subjects
Comparative analysis
Cooperation
Economic psychology
Emotions
Emotions Fairness Path-dependency Reciprocity Social norms
Experimental economics
Fairness
Game theory
Path-dependency
Reciprocity
Social norms
Studies
D63
D74
D64
Path-dependency
Reciprocity
C70
Z13
Emotions
Fairness
Social norms
C72
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Summary:In experimental games, we observe the following phenomena: (1) many subjects cooperate contrary to their material interest, (2) they cooperate in a reciprocal manner, (3) subjects often punish those others who behave unkindly, and (4) previous history usually influences subjects' choices. We propose a simple game-theoretical model to account for these and other experimental phenomena, and compare it with other models of social preferences and reciprocity.
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ISSN:0899-8256
1090-2473
DOI:10.1016/j.geb.2007.10.009