Synthetic horsepox viruses and the continuing debate about dual use research

• Published in: PLoS pathogens Vol. 14; no. 10; p. e1007025
• Main Authors: Noyce, Ryan S, Evans, David H
• Format: Journal Article
• Language: English
• Published: United States Public Library of Science 01.10.2018; Public Library of Science (PLoS)
• Subjects: Biology and life sciences; Biosafety; Cancer; Crime; Deoxyribonucleic acid; DNA; Engineering and Technology; Engineering research; Funding; Genomes; Immunization; Immunology; Laboratories; Legislation; Malaria; Medicine and Health Sciences; Opinion; Research and analysis methods; Risk management; Smallpox; Synthetic biology; Toxins; Vaccines; Virology; Viruses; Edmonton Alberta Canada; Canada
• ISSN: 1553-7374; 1553-7366; 1553-7374
• DOI: 10.1371/journal.ppat.1007025

Funding: The HPXV project is supported by funding from Tonix Pharmaceuticals Ltd. Long-term research support from the Canadian Institutes for Health Research, Natural Sciences & Engineering Research Council, and the Canada Foundation for Innovation is also gratefully acknowledged. Canada’s Human Pathogens and Toxins Act [30] is widely viewed as a model for how to manage the risks posed by pathogenic agents, partly because of the consultative way it was implemented [31]. Besides informing WHO of our research interests [7] and obtaining all of the institutional approvals needed to undertake this work, we obtained a legal review of relevant legislation, and the paper was evaluated by four Canadian federal agencies at our request. Possession of variola virus is a crime in Canada, and other countries have similar laws. Because there are DNA clone libraries [32], WHO recommends that no one should own >20% of the variola genome outside of the two authorized sites [33]. Many countries follow these policies, and some legislate greater restrictions on the size of cloned variola sequences. [...]from a biosafety and biosecurity perspective, we already have controls in place to manage the products of these technologies.