The "Spite" Dilemma in Voluntary Contribution Mechanism Experiments

This article explains deviations from formal expectations regarding choice behavior in settings where economic rationality (i.e., own payoff maximization) dictates either cooperating (full contribution) or free riding (no contribution) in the provision of public goods via the voluntary contribution...

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Bibliographic Details
Published inThe Journal of conflict resolution Vol. 39; no. 3; pp. 535 - 560
Main Authors Saijo, Tatsuyoshi, Nakamura, Hideki
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published 2455 Teller Road, Thousand Oaks, CA 91320 Sage Publications 01.09.1995
SAGE Publications
University of Michigan, Department of Journalism
SAGE PUBLICATIONS, INC
Subjects
Altruism
Behaviorism
Conflict Resolution
Dominant strategy
Economic Policy
Economic theory
Economics
Experiment design
Free rider effect
International relations
International relations theory
Investment strategies
Public goods
Rational Decision
Reading tables
Return on investment
Significance level
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Summary:This article explains deviations from formal expectations regarding choice behavior in settings where economic rationality (i.e., own payoff maximization) dictates either cooperating (full contribution) or free riding (no contribution) in the provision of public goods via the voluntary contribution mechanism. The authors find that the difference between full contribution and the observed level of contribution is greater than or equal to the corresponding difference when free riding is the best strategy. This surprising result is interpreted as the "spiteful" behavior of subjects whose first priority is not the total amount of payoff they receive but the ranking among them.
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ISSN:0022-0027
1552-8766
DOI:10.1177/0022002795039003007