Pro-social missions and worker motivation: An experimental study

• Published in: Journal of economic behavior & organization Vol. 100; pp. 99 - 110
• Main Authors: Fehrler, Sebastian, Kosfeld, Michael
• Format: Journal Article
• Language: English
• Published: Amsterdam Elsevier B.V 01.04.2014; Elsevier Sequoia S.A
• Subjects: Agency theory; Decision analysis; Economic behaviour; Economic theory; Effort; Empirical research; Labor; Labor economics; Labor market; Laboratories; Labour market; Management science; Mission statements; Motivation; NGOs; Non-monetary incentives; Organization; Sorting; Studies; Wages; Organization; Motivation; Effort; NGOs; Non-monetary incentives; Labor; Sorting
• ISSN: 0167-2681; 1879-1751
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2014.01.010

•Some subjects can be motivated by social incentives, such as a donation to their preferred NGO.•Most subjects do not respond to social incentives.•Sorting appears to be important to explain high motivation in mission-oriented organizations. Do employees work harder if their job has the right mission? In a laboratory labor market experiment, we test whether subjects provide higher effort if they can choose the mission of their job. We observe that subjects do not provide higher effort than in a control treatment. Surprised by this finding, we run a second experiment in which subjects can choose whether they want to work on a job with their preferred mission or not. A subgroup of agents (roughly one third) is willing to do so even if this option is more costly than choosing the alternative job. Moreover, we find that these subjects provide substantially higher effort. These results suggest that some workers can be motivated by missions and that selection into mission-oriented organizations is an important factor to explain empirical findings of lower wages and high motivation in these organizations.