A comparison of trust and reciprocity between France and Germany: Experimental investigation based on the investment game

• Published in: Journal of economic psychology Vol. 24; no. 4; pp. 447 - 466
• Main Authors: Willinger, Marc, Keser, Claudia, Lohmann, Christopher, Usunier, Jean-Claude
• Format: Journal Article
• Language: English
• Published: Amsterdam Elsevier B.V 01.08.2003; Elsevier Science; Elsevier; Elsevier Sequoia S.A
• Series: Journal of Economic Psychology
• Subjects: Behavior. Attitude; Biological and medical sciences; Comparative analysis; Economic behaviour; Economic psychology; Economics; Experimental economics; Fundamental and applied biological sciences. Psychology; Game theory; Investment; Psychological aspects; Psychology; Psychology. Psychoanalysis. Psychiatry; Psychology. Psychophysiology; Reciprocity; Social psychology; Studies; Trust; France; Europe; Germany; 2910; Experimental economics; Reciprocity; Social-psychology; 3000; C91; C70; Trust; Human; Crosscultural study; Social behavior; Confidence; Cultural environment; Bargaining; Game value; Economic aspect; Experimental study; Investment
• ISSN: 0167-4870; 1872-7719
• DOI: 10.1016/S0167-4870(02)00165-4

We compare the results of a one-shot investment game, studied earlier by Berg et al. [Games and Economic Behavior 10 (1995) 122], for France and Germany. In this game, player A is the trustor and player B the trustee. The average level of investment is significantly larger in Germany, but the level of reciprocity is not significantly different between the two countries. This implies that German B-players earned significantly more than French B-players. Furthermore, in both countries B-players earned significantly more than A-players. Our results support Fukuyama’s conjecture that the level of trust is higher in Germany than in France, a situation which can explain a higher rate of investment and a higher level of performance. However, our results also show that the increased revenue which is attributable to the higher level of trust, is not shared in a more equitable way, but essentially increases B-players’ payoffs. Finally, based on an intercultural trust experiment, we show that French A subjects did not find German B subjects less trustworthy and German A subjects did not find French B subjects less trustworthy.