International Protection of Intellectual Property

We study the incentives that governments have to protect intellectual property in a trading world economy. We consider a world economy with ongoing innovation in two countries that differ in market size and in their capacity for innovation. After describing the determination of national patent polic...

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Published inThe American economic review Vol. 94; no. 5; pp. 1635 - 1653
Main Authors Grossman, Gene M., Edwin L. C. Lai
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published Nashville American Economic Association 01.12.2004
Subjects
Closed economies
Consumer economics
Countries
Economics
Global economy
Intellectual property
Intellectual property law
International
Marginal costs
Nash equilibrium
Patent policy
Product innovation
Studies
Technological innovation
World economy
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Summary:We study the incentives that governments have to protect intellectual property in a trading world economy. We consider a world economy with ongoing innovation in two countries that differ in market size and in their capacity for innovation. After describing the determination of national patent policies in a noncooperative regime of patent protection, we ask, "Why is intellectual property better protected in the North than in the South?" We also study international patent agreements by deriving the properties of an efficient global regime of patent protection and asking whether harmonization of patent policies is necessary or sufficient for global efficiency.
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ISSN:0002-8282
1944-7981
DOI:10.1257/0002828043052312