A Comparative Sectoral Analysis of Managerial Compensation and Firm Performance

This article examines the relationship between Chief Executive Officer (CEO) compensation packages and firm performance, and the effect of both the 2008 crisis and introduction of the“say-on-pay”(SOP) vote in 2011 on CEO pay in the basic materials, consumer goods and services sectors. The theoretica...

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Bibliographic Details
Published inInternational advances in economic research Vol. 23; no. 3; pp. 359 - 360
Main Authors Dittrich, Ludwig O., Srbek, Pavel
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published New York Springer US 01.08.2017
Springer
Springer Nature B.V
Subjects
Business success
Chief executive officers
Comparative analysis
Compensation and benefits
Economic Growth
Economics
Economics and Finance
Executive compensation
Financial performance
International Economics
Macroeconomics/Monetary Economics//Financial Economics
Microeconomics
Practice
Research Note
Firm Performance Measures
Managerial Compensation
Consumer Goods Sector
Basic Materials Sector
Natural Market Forces
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Summary:This article examines the relationship between Chief Executive Officer (CEO) compensation packages and firm performance, and the effect of both the 2008 crisis and introduction of the“say-on-pay”(SOP) vote in 2011 on CEO pay in the basic materials, consumer goods and services sectors. The theoretical approach to deal with the agency problem can be divided into two broad groups. In the first group are authors who assume that a CEO has a certain degree of managerial power and is able to affect the amount of total pay. The second group, on the other hand, states that high pay can be explained by natural market forces, such as a more intense competition in the market for talents, or by rapid development in technology and growth in the company size.
ISSN:1083-0898
1573-966X
DOI:10.1007/s11294-017-9648-6