Hash functions from superspecial genus-2 curves using Richelot isogenies

• Published in: Journal of mathematical cryptology Vol. 14; no. 1; pp. 268 - 292
• Main Authors: Castryck, Wouter, Decru, Thomas, Smith, Benjamin
• Format: Journal Article
• Language: English
• Published: Berlin De Gruyter 07.08.2020; Walter de Gruyter GmbH
• Subjects: 14G50; 14K02; 94A60; Computer Science; Cryptography; Cryptography and Security; Curves; Fields (mathematics); Graph theory; Isogeny; Mathematics; Number Theory
• ISSN: 1862-2976; 1862-2984
• DOI: 10.1515/jmc-2019-0021

In 2018 Takashima proposed a version of Charles, Goren and Lauter’s hash function using Richelot isogenies, starting from a genus-2 curve that allows for all subsequent arithmetic to be performed over a quadratic finite field 𝔽 . In 2019 Flynn and Ti pointed out that Takashima’s hash function is insecure due to the existence of small isogeny cycles. We revisit the construction and show that it can be repaired by imposing a simple restriction, which moreover clarifies the security analysis. The runtime of the resulting hash function is dominated by the extraction of 3 square roots for every block of 3 bits of the message, as compared to one square root per bit in the elliptic curve case; however in our setting the extractions can be parallelized and are done in a finite field whose bit size is reduced by a factor 3. Along the way we argue that the full supersingular isogeny graph is the wrong context in which to study higher-dimensional analogues of Charles, Goren and Lauter’s hash function, and advocate the use of the superspecial subgraph, which is the natural framework in which to view Takashima’s 𝔽 -friendly starting curve.