Alternative characterizations of the proportional solution for nonconvex bargaining problems with claims

Three alternative characterizations of the proportional solution defined on compact and comprehensive bargaining problems with claims are provided. Two new contraction-type and expansion-type axioms are used. Moreover, the single-valuedness axiom is dispensable if the classical symmetry axiom is imp...

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Bibliographic Details
Published inEconomics letters Vol. 108; no. 2; pp. 229 - 232
Main Authors Lombardi, Michele, Yoshihara, Naoki
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published Elsevier B.V 01.08.2010
Elsevier
SeriesEconomics Letters
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Summary:Three alternative characterizations of the proportional solution defined on compact and comprehensive bargaining problems with claims are provided. Two new contraction-type and expansion-type axioms are used. Moreover, the single-valuedness axiom is dispensable if the classical symmetry axiom is imposed.
Bibliography:ObjectType-Article-2
SourceType-Scholarly Journals-1
ObjectType-Feature-1
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ISSN:0165-1765
1873-7374
DOI:10.1016/j.econlet.2010.03.004