EXPERIENCE, AGENCY, AND PERSONAL IDENTITY

Psychologically based accounts of personal identity over time start from a view of persons as experiencing subjects. Derek Parfit argues that if such an account is to justify the importance we attach to identity it will need to provide a deep unity of consciousness throughout the life of a person, a...

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Bibliographic Details
Published inSocial philosophy & policy Vol. 22; no. 2; pp. 1 - 24
Main Author Schechtman, Marya
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published New York, USA Cambridge University Press 01.07.2005
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Summary:Psychologically based accounts of personal identity over time start from a view of persons as experiencing subjects. Derek Parfit argues that if such an account is to justify the importance we attach to identity it will need to provide a deep unity of consciousness throughout the life of a person, and no such unity is possible. In response, many philosophers have switched to a view of persons as essentially agents, arguing that the importance of identity depends upon agential unity rather than unity of consciousness. While this shift contributes significantly to the discussion, it does not offer a fully satisfying alternative. Unity of consciousness still seems required if identity is to be as important as we think it is. Views of identity based on agential unity do, however, point to a new understanding of unity of consciousness which meets Parfit's challenge, yielding an integrated view of identity which sees persons as both subjects and agents.
Bibliography:PII:S0265052505052015
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ISSN:0265-0525
1471-6437
DOI:10.1017/S0265052505052015