Marginalist and efficient values for TU games

We derive an explicit formula for a marginalist and efficient value for TU game which possesses the null-player property and is either continuous or monotonic. We show that every such value has to be additive and covariant as well. It follows that the set of all marginalist, efficient, and monotonic...

Full description

Saved in:
Bibliographic Details
Published inMathematical social sciences Vol. 38; no. 1; pp. 45 - 54
Main Author Khmelnitskaya, Anna B.
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published Elsevier B.V 01.07.1999
Elsevier
SeriesMathematical Social Sciences
Subjects
Axiomatic characterization
Economic efficiency
Efficiency
Marginalism
Mathematical economics
Transferable utility game
Utility functions
Value
Values
Value
Efficiency
Transferable utility game
Marginalism
Axiomatic characterization
Online AccessGet full text

Cover

More Information
Summary:We derive an explicit formula for a marginalist and efficient value for TU game which possesses the null-player property and is either continuous or monotonic. We show that every such value has to be additive and covariant as well. It follows that the set of all marginalist, efficient, and monotonic values possessing the null-player property coincides with the set of random-order values, and, thereby, the last statement provides an axiomatization without the linearity axiom for the latter which is similar to that of Young for the Shapley value. Another axiomatization without linearity for random-order values is provided by marginalism, efficiency, monotonicity and covariance.
Bibliography:ObjectType-Article-2
SourceType-Scholarly Journals-1
ObjectType-Feature-1
content type line 23
ISSN:0165-4896
1879-3118
DOI:10.1016/S0165-4896(98)00045-6