John Nash and the analysis of strategic behavior
This essay describes one economist’s view of how four extraordinary papers by John Nash, two on non-cooperative game theory [Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, USA 36 (1950b) 48–49; Annals of Mathematics 54 (1951) 286–295] and two on the theory of bargaining [Econometrica 18 (1950a) 15...
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Published in | Economics letters Vol. 75; no. 3; pp. 377 - 382 |
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Main Author | |
Format | Journal Article |
Language | English |
Published |
Elsevier B.V
01.05.2002
Elsevier |
Series | Economics Letters |
Subjects | |
Online Access | Get full text |
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Summary: | This essay describes one economist’s view of how four extraordinary papers by John Nash, two on non-cooperative game theory [Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, USA 36 (1950b) 48–49; Annals of Mathematics 54 (1951) 286–295] and two on the theory of bargaining [Econometrica 18 (1950a) 155–162; Econometrica 21 (1953) 128–140], influenced the development of game theory as a tool for analyzing strategic behavior. |
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Bibliography: | ObjectType-Article-2 SourceType-Scholarly Journals-1 ObjectType-Feature-1 content type line 23 |
ISSN: | 0165-1765 1873-7374 |
DOI: | 10.1016/S0165-1765(01)00624-3 |