Locating a public good on a sphere

• Published in: Economics letters Vol. 139; pp. 46 - 48
• Main Authors: Chatterjee, Swarnendu, Peters, Hans, Storcken, Ton
• Format: Journal Article
• Language: English
• Published: Amsterdam Elsevier B.V 01.02.2016; Elsevier Science Ltd
• Subjects: Agency theory; Coalitional strategy-proofness; Economic models; economics; Pareto optimality; Pareto optimum; Public good; Public goods; Single-peaked preferences; Strict strategy-proofness; Studies; Pareto optimality; Single-peaked preferences; Coalitional strategy-proofness; Strict strategy-proofness; D71

It is shown that in a model where agents have single-peaked preferences on the sphere, every Pareto optimal social choice function that is strict or coalitional strategy-proof, is dictatorial. [web URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0165176515005248]