Locating a public good on a sphere

It is shown that in a model where agents have single-peaked preferences on the sphere, every Pareto optimal social choice function that is strict or coalitional strategy-proof, is dictatorial. [web URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0165176515005248]

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Bibliographic Details
Published inEconomics letters Vol. 139; pp. 46 - 48
Main Authors Chatterjee, Swarnendu, Peters, Hans, Storcken, Ton
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published Amsterdam Elsevier B.V 01.02.2016
Elsevier Science Ltd
Subjects
Agency theory
Coalitional strategy-proofness
Economic models
economics
Pareto optimality
Pareto optimum
Public good
Public goods
Single-peaked preferences
Strict strategy-proofness
Studies
Pareto optimality
Single-peaked preferences
Coalitional strategy-proofness
Strict strategy-proofness
D71
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Summary:It is shown that in a model where agents have single-peaked preferences on the sphere, every Pareto optimal social choice function that is strict or coalitional strategy-proof, is dictatorial. [web URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0165176515005248]
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ISSN:0165-1765
1873-7374
DOI:10.1016/j.econlet.2015.12.015