Contracting officer workload, incomplete contracting, and contractual terms

This article estimates the causal effect of retirement-induced workload spikes on the selection of procurement terms. In a sample of 150,000 contracts from 85 procurement offices over 11 years, increases in workload decrease reliance on competitive acquisition procedures, decrease reliance on firm-f...

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Bibliographic Details
Published inThe Rand journal of economics Vol. 45; no. 2; pp. 395 - 421
Main Author Warren, Patrick L.
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published Santa Monica Blackwell Publishing Ltd 01.06.2014
Wiley Periodicals, Inc
Wiley Subscription Services, Inc
Rand Corporation
Subjects
Acquisitions
Acquisitions & mergers
Analysis
Bargaining
Causality
Competitiveness
Contractors
Contracts
Cost efficiency
Economic competition
Economic theory
Employment
Extended warranties
Fixed price contracts
Government purchasing
Human resources
Organization theory
Procurement
Purchasing
Retirement
Risk theory
Studies
U.S.A
Workloads
United States
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Summary:This article estimates the causal effect of retirement-induced workload spikes on the selection of procurement terms. In a sample of 150,000 contracts from 85 procurement offices over 11 years, increases in workload decrease reliance on competitive acquisition procedures, decrease reliance on firm-fixed-price contracts, increase risk of renegotiation, and increase costs. These estimates are consistent with a model of endogenous ly incomplete contracting. The US federal government has experienced exceptional growth in acquisitions contracting over the past decade but limited growth in acquisitions manpower. This article provides some of the facts necessary to evaluate the consequences of these shifts.
Bibliography:ark:/67375/WNG-H2JQDHDF-H
istex:2727B1918A976BFE4F72B2AAF30CFA34E5FB9E58
ArticleID:RAND12056
Naval Postgraduate School Acquisition Research - No. N00244-11-1-0025
Nancy Huff provided exceptional assistance on this project. I am appreciative to the editor and referees, my colleagues, Horacio Larreguy Arbesú, Ricard Gil, Edward Keating, David McNicol, and participants at the MIT organizational economics seminar, the 2011 WEA Defense Economics‐San Diego sessions, and 2011 ISNIE‐Palo Alto sessions for useful feedback. This material is based upon work supported by the Naval Postgraduate School Acquisition Research Program under grant no. N00244‐11‐1‐0025.
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ISSN:0741-6261
1756-2171
DOI:10.1111/1756-2171.12056