THE INTERNATIONAL ENDORSEMENT OF CORPORATE SETTLEMENTS IN FOREIGN BRIBERY CASES

• Published in: The International and comparative law quarterly Vol. 69; no. 4; pp. 945 - 978
• Main Authors: Ivory, Radha, Søreide, Tina
• Format: Journal Article
• Language: English
• Published: Cambridge, UK Cambridge University Press 01.10.2020
• Subjects: Attorneys; BRIBERY; COMPANIES; Compliance; Convictions; Cooperation; Corporations; CORRUPTION; Crime; Criminal investigations; CRIMINAL LIABILITY; Enforcement; Engineering firms; Fraud; INTERNATIONAL LAW; International organizations; Irony; Liability; Offenses; Public officials; Regulation; Rule of law; Rules; Sanctions; Settlements & damages; Treaties; Trials; Values; White collar crime; United States > US; peer review processes; non-trial resolutions; enforcement; public international law; foreign bribery; corporate criminal liability; OECD Convention; United Nations Convention against Corruption; corruption
• ISSN: 0020-5893; 1471-6895
• DOI: 10.1017/S0020589320000329

International anticorruption treaties create an almost universal requirement that States sanction legal persons for the crime of foreign bribery. However, the vast majority of corporate foreign bribery cases are ‘settled’ between governments and firms. Analysing key anticorruption instruments and treaty body reports, it appears there is a dearth of express rules on settlements in international law but a qualified implicit endorsement of domestic settlement laws and practices. The international regime is investigated in terms of its move towards common standards for the use of settlements, and whether recommendations are consistent with stated objectives. The analysis discloses an irony: States and international organisations fail to clearly articulate their expectations on settlements, while calling for transparent, effective and predictable domestic settlement rules.