The role of independent directors at family firms in relation to corporate social responsibility disclosures

• Published in: International business review Vol. 24; no. 5; pp. 890 - 901
• Main Authors: Cuadrado-Ballesteros, Beatriz, Rodríguez-Ariza, Lázaro, García-Sánchez, Isabel-María
• Format: Journal Article
• Language: English
• Published: Elsevier Ltd 01.10.2015
• Subjects: Board of directors; Business networks; Business organization; Corporate planning; Corporate social responsibility; Corporate social responsibility (CSR); Family firms; Independent directors; Network analysis; Organizational analysis; Organizational behaviour; Organizational structure; G34 – Mergers, acquisitions, restructuring, corporate governance; M14 – Corporate culture; Independent directors; G3 – Corporate finance and governance; Family firms; L26 – Entrepreneurship; Corporate social responsibility (CSR); Social responsibility; Board of directors
• ISSN: 0969-5931; 1873-6149
• DOI: 10.1016/j.ibusrev.2015.04.002

•Family owners’ behaviour affects the level of CSR transparency.•The proportion of independent directors is positively related to CSR disclosures.•In family businesses the “independence” of independent directors may disappear.•Independent directors may be strongly influenced by family owners. In the last few decades, interest in family firms has increased. There are several analyses in relation to leadership, ownership and succession-related topics, but they omit issues related to stakeholders and corporate social responsibility (CSR). This study broadens empirical evidence in this respect. Using a sample composed of internationally listed companies for the period 2003–2009, we analyse CSR information disclosures in family businesses, as well as the fundamental role of the independence of the board in this regard. Our results show that, in general, the higher the proportion of independent directors, the higher the level of CSR information disclosures; but, in the concrete case of family firms, the “independence” of these directors disappeared, thereby reducing the positive association with information disclosure; this was because independent directors may be strongly influenced by family owners, and even by personal or familiar ties.