Efficient Attack Scheme against SKINNY-64 Based on Algebraic Fault Analysis

• Published in: Entropy (Basel, Switzerland) Vol. 25; no. 6; p. 908
• Main Authors: Fang, Xing, Zhang, Hongxin, Cui, Xiaotong, Wang, Yuanzhen, Ding, Linxi
• Format: Journal Article
• Language: English
• Published: Switzerland MDPI AG 07.06.2023; MDPI
• Subjects: Algebra; algebraic fault analysis; Algorithms; Analysis; Ciphers; Cryptography; Decomposition; Efficiency; Encryption; fault injection; Fault location (Engineering); Functions, Algebraic; Internet of Things; key residual entropy; Lightweight; Methods; Security; single bit; SKINNY; China; single bit; key residual entropy; fault injection; algebraic fault analysis; SKINNY
• ISSN: 1099-4300; 1099-4300
• DOI: 10.3390/e25060908

Lightweight block ciphers are normally used in low-power resource-constrained environments, while providing reliable and sufficient security. Therefore, it is important to study the security and reliability of lightweight block ciphers. SKINNY is a new lightweight tweakable block cipher. In this paper, we present an efficient attack scheme for SKINNY-64 based on algebraic fault analysis. The optimal fault injection location is given by analyzing the diffusion of a single-bit fault at different locations during the encryption process. At the same time, by combining the algebraic fault analysis method based on S-box decomposition, the master key can be recovered in an average time of 9 s using one fault. To the best of our knowledge, our proposed attack scheme requires fewer faults, is faster to solve, and has a higher success rate than other existing attack methods.