On a private information game without pure strategy equilibria

We present an example of a two-person game of private information in which there is no equilibrium in pure strategies. Our example satisfies all the hypotheses of the existence theorems present in the literature on the subject of pure strategy equilibria, except for the fact that the action set of e...

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Bibliographic Details
Published inJournal of mathematical economics Vol. 31; no. 3; pp. 341 - 359
Main Authors Khan, M.Ali, Rath, Kali P., Sun, Yeneng
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published Amsterdam Elsevier B.V 01.04.1999
Elsevier Sequoia S.A
Subjects
Economic models
Economic theory
Equilibrium
Game theory
Information
Private information game
Pure strategy equilibria
Studies
Theorems
Private information game
Theorems
Pure strategy equilibria
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Summary:We present an example of a two-person game of private information in which there is no equilibrium in pure strategies. Our example satisfies all the hypotheses of the existence theorems present in the literature on the subject of pure strategy equilibria, except for the fact that the action set of each player is given by the interval [−1,1]. As such, it illustrates the limitations that pertain to the purification of equilibria in a standard setting.
Bibliography:ObjectType-Article-1
SourceType-Scholarly Journals-1
content type line 14
ISSN:0304-4068
1873-1538
DOI:10.1016/S0304-4068(97)00063-3