At the core of reasoning: Dissociating deductive and non‐deductive load

• Published in: Human brain mapping Vol. 39; no. 4; pp. 1850 - 1861
• Main Authors: Coetzee, John P., Monti, Martin M.
• Format: Journal Article
• Language: English
• Published: United States John Wiley & Sons, Inc 01.04.2018; John Wiley and Sons Inc
• Subjects: Activation; Adolescent; Brain - diagnostic imaging; Brain - physiology; Brain Mapping; Cognition; Cognition & reasoning; Cognitive ability; cognitive load; Computer networks; Deduction; Female; fMRI; Frontal gyrus; Functional magnetic resonance imaging; Humans; Language; Magnetic Resonance Imaging; Male; Medical imaging; Neuroimaging; Neurology; Pattern Recognition, Visual - physiology; Problem Solving - physiology; propositional calculus; Reasoning; Short term memory; Substrates; Temporal lobe; Young Adult; propositional calculus; fMRI; cognitive load; language; deduction; reasoning
• ISSN: 1065-9471; 1097-0193; 1097-0193
• DOI: 10.1002/hbm.23979

In recent years, neuroimaging methods have been used to investigate how the human mind carries out deductive reasoning. According to some, the neural substrate of language is integral to deductive reasoning. According to others, deductive reasoning is supported by a language‐independent distributed network including left frontopolar and frontomedial cortices. However, it has been suggested that activity in these frontal regions might instead reflect non‐deductive factors such as working memory load and general cognitive difficulty. To address this issue, 20 healthy volunteers participated in an fMRI experiment in which they evaluated matched simple and complex deductive and non‐deductive arguments in a 2 × 2 design. The contrast of complex versus simple deductive trials resulted in a pattern of activation closely matching previous work, including frontopolar and frontomedial “core” areas of deduction as well as other “cognitive support” areas in frontoparietal cortices. Conversely, the contrast of complex and simple non‐deductive trials resulted in a pattern of activation that does not include any of the aforementioned “core” areas. Direct comparison of the load effect across deductive and non‐deductive trials further supports the view that activity in the regions previously interpreted as “core” to deductive reasoning cannot merely reflect non‐deductive load, but instead might reflect processes specific to the deductive calculus. Finally, consistent with previous reports, the classical language areas in left inferior frontal gyrus and posterior temporal cortex do not appear to participate in deductive inference beyond their role in encoding stimuli presented in linguistic format.