Feedback Produces Divergence from Prospect Theory in Descriptive Choice

• Published in: Psychological science Vol. 19; no. 10; pp. 1015 - 1022
• Main Authors: Jessup, Ryan K., Bishara, Anthony J., Busemeyer, Jerome R.
• Format: Journal Article
• Language: English
• Published: Los Angeles, CA Blackwell Publishing 01.10.2008; SAGE Publications; SAGE PUBLICATIONS, INC
• Subjects: Attention; Choice Behavior; Culture; Decision Making; Expected utility; Experiential learning; Experimentation; Feedback; Feedback, Psychological; Frequentism; Gambling; Gambling - psychology; Humans; Information feedback; Modeling; Motivation; Observed choices; Parametric models; Probability Learning; Problem-Based Learning; Prospect theory; Psychology; Risk-Taking; Term weighting; Underweight; Weighting
• ISSN: 0956-7976; 1467-9280; 1467-9280
• DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9280.2008.02193.x

A recent study demonstrated that individuals making experience-based choices underweight small probabilities, in contrast to the overweighting observed in a typical descriptive paradigm. We tested whether trial- by-trial feedback in a repeated descriptive paradigm would engender choices more correspondent with experiential or descriptive paradigms. The results of a repeated gambling task indicated that individuals receiving feedback underweighted small probabilities, relative to their no-feedback counterparts. These results implicate feedback as a critical component during the decision-making process, even in the presence of fully specified descriptive information. A model comparison at the individual-subject level suggested that feedback drove individuals' decision weights toward objective probability weighting.