Status Quo Bias, Rationality, and Conservatism about Value

Many economists and philosophers assume that status quo bias is necessarily irrational. I argue that, in some cases, status quo bias is fully rational. I discuss the rationality of status quo bias on both subjective and objective theories of the rationality of preferences. I argue that subjective th...

Full description

Saved in:
Bibliographic Details
Published inEthics Vol. 125; no. 2; pp. 449 - 476
Main Author Nebel, Jacob M.
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published Chicago University of Chicago Press 01.01.2015
University of Chicago, acting through its Press
Subjects
Bias
Common Sense
Conservatism
Economists
Empirical evidence
Ethics
Focalism
Morality
Motivation
Normativity
Philosophers
Philosophy
Preferences
Rationality
Reason
Relevant alternatives
Status quo bias
Subjectivism
Online AccessGet full text

Cover

More Information
Summary:Many economists and philosophers assume that status quo bias is necessarily irrational. I argue that, in some cases, status quo bias is fully rational. I discuss the rationality of status quo bias on both subjective and objective theories of the rationality of preferences. I argue that subjective theories cannot plausibly condemn this bias as irrational. I then discuss one kind of objective theory, which holds that a conservative bias toward existing things of value is rational. This account can fruitfully explain some compelling aspects of common sense morality, and it may justify status quo bias.
Bibliography:ObjectType-Article-1
SourceType-Scholarly Journals-1
ObjectType-Feature-2
content type line 23
ISSN:0014-1704
1539-297X
DOI:10.1086/678482