Three Wrongs Do Not Make a Right: The Conundrum of the US Steel and Aluminum Tariffs

• Published in: World trade review Vol. 18; no. 3; pp. 481 - 501
• Main Author: LEE, YONG-SHIK
• Format: Journal Article
• Language: English
• Published: Cambridge, UK Cambridge University Press 01.07.2019
• Subjects: Agreements; Aluminum; Aluminum industry and trade; Economic aspects; Foreign trade regulation; International relations; International trade; Law and legislation; National security; Provisions; Snipings; Steel industry; Steel industry and trade; Steel production; Tariff; Tariffs; Textiles; Trade restrictions; World Trade Organization; UNITED STATES; Canada; Argentina; South Korea; Turkey; United States > US; China; Brazil; Mexico; Russia; India
• ISSN: 1474-7456; 1475-3138
• DOI: 10.1017/S147474561900020X

In March 2018, the United States enacted tariff increases on a vast range of imported steel and aluminum products. The Trump administration cited national security concerns as the justification, claiming an exception under GATT Article XXI. In response to these tariffs, several WTO Members, including the European Union, Canada, Mexico, China, Russia, and Turkey, adopted their own tariffs against imports from the United States, justifying their tariffs under the WTO Agreement on Safeguards. Other Members, such as South Korea, Brazil, and Argentina opted for quota agreements on these exports with the United States in exchange for exemption from the tariffs. This article argues that none of these measures is consistent with WTO rules. The sweeping tariffs that the United States have adopted, the retaliatory measures that several Members have implemented, and the bilateral quota agreements that three Members concluded with the United States are indeed ‘three wrongs’ that do not make a right, but rather endanger the stability of the international trading system under WTO legal disciplines.