Advertising and the screening role of mass media

We argue that there exists a problem of adverse selection in the provision of advertising which makes it impossible to establish direct markets for it. The media are regarded as intermediaries that can channel advertising and allocate it efficiently by screening consumers. This role of media may res...

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Bibliographic Details
Published inInformation economics and policy Vol. 20; no. 2; pp. 107 - 119
Main Authors Kremhelmer, Susanne, Zenger, Hans
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published Amsterdam Elsevier B.V 01.06.2008
Elsevier
Elsevier Sequoia S.A
SeriesInformation Economics and Policy
Subjects
Adverse selection
Advertising
Economics
Market
Mass media
Media
Media economics
Preferences
Studies
Adverse selection
L11
Advertising
Media economics
L82
D82
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Summary:We argue that there exists a problem of adverse selection in the provision of advertising which makes it impossible to establish direct markets for it. The media are regarded as intermediaries that can channel advertising and allocate it efficiently by screening consumers. This role of media may result in excessive quality and prices of media products. These distortions will be more severe if consumers’ quality preferences are relatively homogenous.
Bibliography:ObjectType-Article-2
SourceType-Scholarly Journals-1
ObjectType-Feature-1
content type line 23
ISSN:0167-6245
1873-5975
DOI:10.1016/j.infoecopol.2007.11.003