Real and Accrual-Based Earnings Management in the Pre- and Post-IFRS Periods: Evidence from China

The purpose of this study is to investigate the prevalence of both accrual‐ and activities‐based earnings management for Chinese A‐share firms surrounding the adoption of substantially IFRS‐convergent accounting standards. Since 2007, all listed A‐share firms in China have been required to comply wi...

Full description

Saved in:
Bibliographic Details
Published inJournal of international financial management & accounting Vol. 26; no. 3; pp. 294 - 335
Main Authors Ho, Li-Chin Jennifer, Liao, Qunfeng, Taylor, Martin
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published Oxford Blackwell Publishing Ltd 01.10.2015
Subjects
Online AccessGet full text

Cover

Loading…
More Information
Summary:The purpose of this study is to investigate the prevalence of both accrual‐ and activities‐based earnings management for Chinese A‐share firms surrounding the adoption of substantially IFRS‐convergent accounting standards. Since 2007, all listed A‐share firms in China have been required to comply with a new set of accounting standards that have substantially conformed to IFRS. The new reform also produced a set of new auditing standards and internal control reporting requirements. Based on a sample of 4,050 firm‐year observations from 2002 to 2011, we find that Chinese firms in the post‐IFRS period (2007–2011) are less likely to engage in accrual‐based earnings management. The magnitude of discretionary accruals also declines after IFRS adoption. In response, we see firms turning to real activities manipulation as a substitute for upward earnings management. The reduction in accrual‐based earnings management could stem from higher quality accounting standards associated with IFRS adoption and/or concurrent changes in the governance regimes introduced with the IFRS mandate. A further analysis, however, indicates that the benefits of IFRS adoption in curbing upward accrual‐based earnings manipulation are not evenly distributed across firms. Specifically, the benefit diminishes for firms that are controlled by Chinese central or local governments, are located in less developed regions, and that have weak financial performance and therefore subject to delisting status. We also find that the benefit is less pronounced for manufacturing firms than for their non‐manufacturing counterparts.
Bibliography:ark:/67375/WNG-TJDTJDVD-P
ArticleID:JIFM12030
istex:755E0AE7F1C2625651790A2AA78087FDCEE66F92
ObjectType-Article-1
SourceType-Scholarly Journals-1
ObjectType-Feature-2
content type line 23
ISSN:0954-1314
1467-646X
DOI:10.1111/jifm.12030