Sophisticated preference aggregation

• Published in: Social choice and welfare Vol. 33; no. 1; pp. 73 - 86
• Main Authors: Sanver, M. Remzi, Selçuk, Özer
• Format: Journal Article
• Language: English
• Published: Berlin/Heidelberg Springer Science + Business Media 01.06.2009; Springer-Verlag; Springer Nature B.V
• Subjects: Aggregation; Ambiguity; Ambivalence; Dictatorship; Distribution; Economic Theory/Quantitative Economics/Mathematical Methods; Economics; Economics and Finance; Game Theory; International Political Economy; Mathematical transitivity; Oligarchy; Original Paper; Pareto efficiency; Pareto optimum; Power; Power Structure; Preferences; Probabilistic modeling; Public choice; Public Finance; Rational Choice; Social and Behav. Sciences; Social choice; Social Policy; Social research; Social Welfare; Society; Studies; Power Distribution; Pareto Optimal; Social Choice; Social Preference; Social Welfare Function
• ISSN: 0176-1714; 1432-217X
• DOI: 10.1007/s00355-008-0346-4

A Sophisticated Social Welfare Function (SSWF) is a mapping from profiles of individual preferences into a sophisticated preference which is a pairwise weighted comparison of alternatives. We characterize Pareto optimal and pairwise independent SSWFs in terms of oligarchies that are induced by some power distribution in the society. This is a fairly large class ranging from dictatoriality to anonymous aggregation rules. Our results generalize the impossibility theorem of Arrow (Social choice and individual values. Wiley, New York, 1951) and the oligarchy theorem of Gibbard (Intransitive social indifference and the Arrow dilemma, University of Chicago, unpublished manuscript, 1969).