Timed-release encryption anonymous interaction protocol based on smart contract

• Published in: Journal of cloud computing : advances, systems and applications Vol. 13; no. 1; pp. 3 - 12
• Main Authors: Yuan, Ke, Wang, Zilin, Chen, Keyan, Zhou, Bingcai, Li, Zheng, Jia, Chunfu
• Format: Journal Article
• Language: English
• Published: Berlin/Heidelberg Springer Berlin Heidelberg 01.12.2024; Springer Nature B.V; SpringerOpen
• Subjects: Algorithms; Anonymous interaction; Blockchain; Computer Communication Networks; Computer Science; Computer System Implementation; Computer Systems Organization and Communication Networks; Cryptography; Encryption; Fragments; Information Systems Applications (incl.Internet); Onion routing; Onions; Protocol; Queries; Smart contract; Software Engineering/Programming and Operating Systems; Special Purpose and Application-Based Systems; Timed-release encryption; Onion routing; Smart contract; Anonymous interaction; Blockchain; Timed-release encryption
• ISSN: 2192-113X; 2192-113X
• DOI: 10.1186/s13677-023-00536-1

Timed-release encryption (TRE) is a cryptographic primitive that can control the decryption time and has significant application value in time-sensitive scenarios. To solve the reliability issue of nodes in existing TRE anonymous interaction schemes, we propose a blockchain-based TRE protocol for anonymous query time trapdoors. In our protocol, the recipient divides the encrypted trapdoor request information into n ciphertext fragments using secret sharing technology near the decryption time, and employs the idea of onion routing to perform layer-by-layer encryption, creating onion-type data transmitted through middlemen selected from the smart contract. After receiving the ciphertext fragments, the time server integrates them to obtain the trapdoor request information and returns the corresponding time trapdoor to the recipient. This allows the recipient to query any time trapdoor anonymously. Our protocol provides a normative design for the smart contract and specific constraints on the participants’ behavior. Compared with the related anonymous query trapdoor schemes, our protocol improves the probability of successful queries. Security analysis shows that our protocol can resist release-ahead attack, interruption attack, eavesdropping attack, and replacement attack. Performance analysis shows that our protocol outperforms related protocols regarding anonymity, efficiency, and flexibility, achieving highly efficient anonymous interactions. Finally, we conducted an experiment in the Ethereum Rinkeby test network. For the settings of ciphertext fragment number n = 3 and ciphertext fragment threshold t = 2 , the gas consumption for a user to execute the contract was $5.66, which was higher than the contract cost of related schemes, but the contract execution cost was within an acceptable range.