Effectuating Public International Law through Market Mechanisms?
Traditionally, the enforcement of public international law (PIL) was a task of states: its addressees and its enforcers were states. That has changed recently. Whereas the influence of private market actors on the making of PIL has been extensively analyzed, their influence on its enforcement has be...
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| Published in | Journal of institutional and theoretical economics Vol. 165; no. 1; pp. 33 - 57 |
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| Main Author | |
| Format | Journal Article |
| Language | English |
| Published |
Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen
01.03.2009
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| Series | Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE) |
| Online Access | Get more information |
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| Summary: | Traditionally, the enforcement of public international law (PIL) was a task of states: its addressees and its enforcers were states. That has changed recently. Whereas the influence of private market actors on the making of PIL has been extensively analyzed, their influence on its enforcement has been neglected, although the idea of using private interests in order to foster social goals has a long history. This article draws on theoretical insights of a rational-choice approach to PIL in order to analyze the prerequisites of effectuating PIL through privatemarket-actor incentives and market mechanisms. |
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| ISSN: | 0932-4569 |
| DOI: | 10.1628/093245609787369769 |