The Division of Labor, Coordination Costs, and Knowledge

This paper considers specialization and the division of labor. A more extensive division of labor raises productivity because returns to the time spent on tasks are usually greater to workers who concentrate on a narrower range of skills. The traditional discussion of the division of labor emphasize...

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Bibliographic Details
Published inThe Quarterly journal of economics Vol. 107; no. 4; pp. 1137 - 1160
Main Authors Becker, Gary S., Murphy, Kevin M.
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published Cambridge, Mass. [etc.] MIT Press 01.11.1992
Published for Harvard University by the MIT Press
Oxford University Press
Subjects
Capital costs
Cost efficiency
Division of labor
Economic costs
Economic models
Economic theory
Economics
Employee efficiency
Human capital
Knowledge
Labor costs
Labor economics
Labor force
Production functions
Productivity
Specialization
Teachers
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Summary:This paper considers specialization and the division of labor. A more extensive division of labor raises productivity because returns to the time spent on tasks are usually greater to workers who concentrate on a narrower range of skills. The traditional discussion of the division of labor emphasizes the limitations to specialization imposed by the extent of the market. We claim that the degree of specialization is more often determined by other considerations. Especially emphasized are various costs of “coordinating” specialized workers who perform complementary tasks, and the amount of general knowledge available.
Bibliography:istex:37D50E7813B5A33EFDD2C98EA9194EFC7B682B39
ark:/67375/HXZ-JJ7HH0XZ-N
ISSN:0033-5533
1531-4650
DOI:10.2307/2118383