Anonymity in the dictator game revisited

• Published in: Journal of economic behavior & organization Vol. 81; no. 1; pp. 74 - 81
• Main Authors: Franzen, Axel, Pointner, Sonja
• Format: Journal Article
• Language: English
• Published: Amsterdam Elsevier B.V 2012; Elsevier Sequoia S.A
• Subjects: Anonymity; Comparative analysis; Dictator game; Dictators; Experimental economics; Experimental game theory; Experimental psychology; Eyes; Fairness; Game theory; Games; Games of strategy; Other-regarding preferences; Preferences; Randomized response technique; Studies; Other-regarding preferences; Experimental game theory; D03; Randomized response technique; C91; Fairness; Dictator game; C72
• ISSN: 0167-2681; 1879-1751
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2011.09.005

► We use the randomized-response technique to increase anonymity in the dictator game. ► Giving almost disappears if anonymity is implemented via RRT. ► Additionally, we control for the appropriateness of applying RRT. Giving in the dictator game has often been interpreted as evidence of other-regarding preferences. We suspect that giving is determined by subjects’ attempts to appear fair in the eyes of recipients and the experimenter. Therefore, we investigate behavior in the dictator game by using the randomized response technique to increase anonymity. Overall, 290 subjects participated in two experiments. The results demonstrate that the randomized response technique reduces giving to negligible amounts compared to the standard double blind condition. Thus, our results suggest that individuals closely follow egoistic motives in the dictator game when anonymity is convincingly implemented.