Necessity in Self-Defense and War

Philosophers generally agree that justified self-defense must meet four conditions. First, the defender must face an unjustified threat. Second, there must be some grounds to prefer the defender's interests to those of his target. Third, the force used must be proportionate to the threat averte...

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Bibliographic Details
Published inPhilosophy & public affairs Vol. 40; no. 1; pp. 3 - 44
Main Author LAZAR, SETH
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published Malden, USA Blackwell Publishing Inc 2012
Wiley Subscription Services, Inc
Wiley
Blackwell Publishing Ltd
Subjects
Epistemology. Philosophy of science. Theory of knowledge
Ethics
Immunity
Individualism
Injustice
International law
Killing
Laws of war
Morality
Necessary conditions
Philosophers
Philosophical thought
Philosophy
Politics
Public Interest
Right of self defense
Self defense
Self-management
War
Knowledge theory
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Summary:Philosophers generally agree that justified self-defense must meet four conditions. First, the defender must face an unjustified threat. Second, there must be some grounds to prefer the defender's interests to those of his target. Third, the force used must be proportionate to the threat averted: the threat must be of sufficient magnitude to justify that much force. And fourth, the force used must be necessary to avert the threat. Here, Lazar analyzes the concept of necessity in self-defense, the application of this analysis to war and its application in the laws of war.
Bibliography:istex:7D8DBEBE4CE9414E3CE2F1A6BEE8FB2AF0C4991B
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ArticleID:PAPA1214
I conducted research for this article at Nuffield College and the Institute for Ethics, Law, and Armed Conflict at the University of Oxford, the Institute for Advanced Studies at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, and at the Centre for Moral, Social, and Political Theory, in the School of Philosophy at the Australian National University. My sincere thanks to each of these institutions. I presented some of this work in Jerusalem at the IAS, and at the ANU Thursday Seminar. Along the way I have discussed necessity with many people, whose help has been invaluable. Yitzhak Benbaji, Tom Dougherty, and David Luban were particularly important in helping shape my views. I also learned a great deal about necessity from Christian Barry, Stephanie Collins, Janina Dill, David Enoch, Bob Goodin, Al Hájek, Holly Lawford‐Smith, Philip Pettit, Iddo Porat, Daniel Schwartz, Henry Shue, Nic Southwood, Danny Statman, and Michael Walzer. The editor and reviewers for
Philosophy & Public Affairs
were instrumental in improving the article, especially Section IV.B; again, thanks.
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ISSN:0048-3915
1088-4963
DOI:10.1111/j.1088-4963.2012.01214.x