Managing constraint: frugal opposition to European fiscal solidarity
The management of the COVID-19 crisis and, in particular, the Next Generation EU fund have shown that European leaders can find integrationist policy solutions despite increasing politicisation at home where democratic constraints may lead to a feared 'multilevel politics trap'. Therefore,...
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Published in | Journal of European public policy Vol. 31; no. 10; pp. 3275 - 3298 |
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Main Authors | , |
Format | Journal Article |
Language | English |
Published |
England
Routledge
02.10.2024
Taylor & Francis Ltd |
Subjects | |
Online Access | Get full text |
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Summary: | The management of the COVID-19 crisis and, in particular, the Next Generation EU fund have shown that European leaders can find integrationist policy solutions despite increasing politicisation at home where democratic constraints may lead to a feared 'multilevel politics trap'. Therefore, we ask whether and how national governments can manage such constraints and thus spring or avoid the trap. Theoretically, we argue that the agency of governments is a crucial factor for understanding the varying dynamics of politicisation in regional integration, as governments can raise or lower domestic audience costs by strategically interacting with their parliament or media. Empirically, we probe the plausibility of our theoretical propositions by examining constraint management and position-taking in Austria and the Netherlands in the context of European fiscal solidarity. Our results show that there is no inevitably self-reinforcing multilevel politics trap but that the effects of domestic constraint are, to a considerable extent, contingent on the agency of national governments. |
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Bibliography: | ObjectType-Article-1 SourceType-Scholarly Journals-1 ObjectType-Feature-2 content type line 23 Supplemental data for this article can be accessed online at https://doi.org/10.1080/13501763.2024.2332697 |
ISSN: | 1350-1763 1466-4429 |
DOI: | 10.1080/13501763.2024.2332697 |