Private enforcement and social efficiency

This paper makes precise the distributional consequences and social efficiency of private enforcement of property rights. Properties of different values are subject to predation and owners choose between self-defense and private enforcement services. A distributional conflict of interest arises as p...

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Bibliographic Details
Published inJournal of development economics Vol. 77; no. 2; pp. 341 - 366
Main Authors Anderson, James E., Bandiera, Oriana
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published Amsterdam Elsevier B.V 01.08.2005
Elsevier
Elsevier Sequoia S.A
SeriesJournal of Development Economics
Subjects
Conflicts of interest
Enforcement
Game theory
Income distribution
Law enforcement
Legal protection
Market structure
Mathematical models
Owners
Poverty
Private enforcement
Private sector
Property rights
Self defense
Social conditions & trends
Social economics
Social security
Studies
Welfare
K11
O17
Private enforcement
Property rights
Online AccessGet full text
ISSN0304-3878
1872-6089
DOI10.1016/j.jdeveco.2004.05.003

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Summary:This paper makes precise the distributional consequences and social efficiency of private enforcement of property rights. Properties of different values are subject to predation and owners choose between self-defense and private enforcement services. A distributional conflict of interest arises as private protection purchased by rich owners deflects predators on low value properties. The market structure of enforcement and development affect the distribution of property income through relative changes in the security of high and low values property. Moreover, because of the externality enforcers impose on poorer owners, the availability of private enforcement may constrain the policy of a benevolent State.
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ISSN:0304-3878
1872-6089
DOI:10.1016/j.jdeveco.2004.05.003