Property rights and the political organization of agriculture

We propose a general equilibrium model where the economic organization of agriculture and the political equilibrium determining the security of property rights are jointly determined. In particular, because the form of organization may affect the probability and distribution of benefits from future...

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Bibliographic Details
Published inJournal of development economics Vol. 82; no. 2; pp. 416 - 447
Main Authors Conning, Jonathan H., Robinson, James A.
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published Amsterdam Elsevier B.V 01.03.2007
Elsevier
Elsevier Sequoia S.A
SeriesJournal of Development Economics
Subjects
Agrarian organization
Agrarian reform
Agriculture
Economic models
General economic equilibrium
India
Industrial organization
Land use
Model testing
Political economy
Property rights
Squatters
Studies
Tenancy
India
Tenancy
Squatters
O12
Agrarian organization
Q15
N50
Political economy
D72
Agrarian reform
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Summary:We propose a general equilibrium model where the economic organization of agriculture and the political equilibrium determining the security of property rights are jointly determined. In particular, because the form of organization may affect the probability and distribution of benefits from future property challenges, it may be shaped in anticipation of this impact. Property rights security may then be secured at the expense of economic efficiency. The model provides a framework for understanding why in some contexts land is redistributed primarily via land sales and tenancy markets but via politics and conflict in others. We test some implications of the theory using a five-decade panel dataset that traces changes in the extent of tenancy and tenancy reform across 15 Indian states.
Bibliography:ObjectType-Article-2
SourceType-Scholarly Journals-1
ObjectType-Feature-1
content type line 23
ISSN:0304-3878
1872-6089
DOI:10.1016/j.jdeveco.2005.08.001