Choices of organizational structures in religious organizations: a game theoretic approach

• Published in: Journal of economic behavior & organization Vol. 47; no. 1; pp. 55 - 70
• Main Authors: Mao, Wen, Zech, Charles
• Format: Journal Article
• Language: English
• Published: Amsterdam Elsevier B.V 2002; Elsevier; Elsevier Sequoia S.A
• Series: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
• Subjects: Churches; Economic theory; Economics; Game theory; Mathematical models; Maximin strategy; Nash equilibrium; Organization theory; Organizational structure; Pay-off; Preferences; Religious doctrine; Religious groups; Religious organizations; Studies; P00; Nash equilibrium; Organizational structure; Maximin strategy; Religious doctrine; C72
• ISSN: 0167-2681; 1879-1751
• DOI: 10.1016/S0167-2681(01)00168-8

This study has extended the work done by Allen [Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 27 (1995) 97] and others who attempted to show a relationship between a denomination’s doctrine and its organizational structure. While Allen’s work resulted in a one-to-one mapping between doctrinal beliefs and organizational structure, this study has argued that there exists a continuum of structures that are consistent with a particular church’s doctrine. The church’s ultimate organizational structure is a game theoretic outcome resulting when churches attempt to maximize membership subject to the constraints imposed by their doctrines. We examine how churches’ organizational structures depend on the extent to which members are willing to sacrifice their structural preferences to hold on to their doctrines. Consistent with Allen’s outcome, our result indicates the further apart are the doctrines held by two churches, the greater the variation in their structural organization. This paper also examines the relationship between churches’ organizational structures and the degree of the majority church’s majority.