Punitive Sanctions and the Transition Rate from Welfare to Work

In the Netherlands, the average exit rate out of welfare is dramatically low. Most welfare recipients have to comply with guidelines on job search effort that are imposed by the welfare agency. If they do not, then a sanction in the form of a temporary benefit reduction can be imposed. This article...

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Bibliographic Details
Published inJournal of labor economics Vol. 22; no. 1; pp. 211 - 241
Main Authors van den Berg, Gerard J., van der Klaauw, Bas, van Ours, Jan C.
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published Chicago The University of Chicago Press 01.01.2004
University of Chicago, acting through its Press
Subjects
Children
Data analysis
Economic models
Economic sanctions
Economic theory
Economics
Employment
Industrial relations
Job hunting
Job search firms
Netherlands
Parametric models
Public assistance programs
Sanctions
Single status
Social security
Social support
Studies
Unemployment
Unemployment insurance
Welfare
Netherlands
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Summary:In the Netherlands, the average exit rate out of welfare is dramatically low. Most welfare recipients have to comply with guidelines on job search effort that are imposed by the welfare agency. If they do not, then a sanction in the form of a temporary benefit reduction can be imposed. This article investigates the effect of such sanctions on the transition rate from welfare to work using a unique set of rich register data on welfare recipients. We find that the imposition of sanctions substantially increases the individual transition rate from welfare to work.
Bibliography:ObjectType-Article-2
SourceType-Scholarly Journals-1
ObjectType-Feature-1
content type line 23
ISSN:0734-306X
1537-5307
DOI:10.1086/380408