On Target? The Israeli Supreme Court and the Expansion of Targeted Killings

Israel has used "targeted killings" against suspected terrorists since the alAqsa intifada began in September 2000. By the end of 2005, almost 300 terrorist organization members and 150 civilian bystanders had been killed in targeted killings, in addition to hundreds of civilians wounded.1...

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Bibliographic Details
Published inThe Yale law journal Vol. 116; no. 8; pp. 1873 - 1881
Main Author Eichensehr, Kristen E.
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published New Haven The Yale Law Journal Company 01.06.2007
Yale University, School of Law
Yale Law Journal Company, Inc
Subjects
Arab-Israeli conflict
Armed conflict
Civilians
Combatants
Comment
Customary international law
Defence policy
Geneva Convention
International hostility
International law
Israel
Laws, regulations and rules
Military deployment
Murders & murder attempts
Participation
Proportionality (Law)
Public law
Reading
Right of self defense
Self defense
Statutory interpretation
Supreme Court
Supreme Court decisions
Terrorism
Terrorists
War
War (International law)
Weapons
Israel
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Summary:Israel has used "targeted killings" against suspected terrorists since the alAqsa intifada began in September 2000. By the end of 2005, almost 300 terrorist organization members and 150 civilian bystanders had been killed in targeted killings, in addition to hundreds of civilians wounded.1 The policy has received wide international condemnation2 and has sparked vigorous debate among scholars about its lawfulness. After four years of consideration,3 the Israeli Supreme Court recently weighed in with the world's first judicial decision on targeted killings in Public Committee Against Torture in Israel v. Government of Israel (PCATI). In PCATI, the court held that terrorists are civilians under the law of armed conflict and thus are lawfully subject to attack only when they directly participate in hostilities.4 But the court also expanded the traditional definition of "direct participation" and the time period during which civilians may lawfully be attacked. By disregarding the "direct participation" requirement's important evidentiary function, the court weakened the protections that international law affords to all civilians, not just to terrorists. [PUBLICATION ABSTRACT]
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ISSN:0044-0094
1939-8611
DOI:10.2307/20455778