Audience costs and reputation in crisis bargaining

In crisis bargaining literature, it is conventional wisdom that the ability of generating higher audience costs is an advantage for a leader of a state. However, empirical studies show that democratic states use this mechanism only occasionally. This paper formally shows that higher audience costs m...

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Bibliographic Details
Published inGames and economic behavior Vol. 88; pp. 250 - 259
Main Author Özyurt, Selçuk
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published Duluth Elsevier Inc 01.11.2014
Academic Press
Subjects
Audience
Audiences
Bargaining
Behavioral types
Conflict resolution
Cost benefit analysis
Costs
Democracy
Democratic countries
Diplomacy
International conflicts
Literature
Management of crises
Probability
Reputation management
Studies
D74
International conflicts
Behavioral types
C78
Conflict resolution
Bargaining
C72
D82
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Summary:In crisis bargaining literature, it is conventional wisdom that the ability of generating higher audience costs is an advantage for a leader of a state. However, empirical studies show that democratic states use this mechanism only occasionally. This paper formally shows that higher audience costs may be good or bad depending on (1) the benefit-cost ratio of the crisis, (2) initial probability of resolve, and (3) how fast states generate audience costs with time. In particular, if the value of the prize over the cost of attacking is low or the initial probability of resolve is high enough, then having greater ability to generate audience costs may undermine democratic states' diplomatic success.
Bibliography:ObjectType-Article-1
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ISSN:0899-8256
1090-2473
DOI:10.1016/j.geb.2014.09.008