The Erosion and Sustainability of Norms and Morale

I examine why the performance of an organization is often subject to gradual erosion. I assume that players are motivated partly by psychological factors, norms and morale, and that they are willing to exert extra efforts if others do so. I show that repeated random shocks induce the erosion of the...

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Bibliographic Details
Published inJapanese economic review (Oxford, England) Vol. 54; no. 1; pp. 29 - 48
Main Author Kandori, Michihiro
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published Oxford, UK and Boston, USA Blackwell Publishing Ltd 01.03.2003
Springer Nature B.V
Subjects
Business studies
Economic theory
Economics
Employee morale
Game theory
Material incentives
Motivation
Norms
Organization
Organizational behavior
Organizational dysfunctions
Psychological aspects
Social norms
Studies
Sustainability
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Summary:I examine why the performance of an organization is often subject to gradual erosion. I assume that players are motivated partly by psychological factors, norms and morale, and that they are willing to exert extra efforts if others do so. I show that repeated random shocks induce the erosion of the extra efforts supported by norms and morale, but they do not completely decay; in the long run a certain range of efforts are sustainable. Hence different organizations typically enjoy diverse norms and morale, which persist for a long time, in the vicinity of the equilibrium determined by material incentives.
Bibliography:ark:/67375/WNG-JBRZHWWG-R
ArticleID:JERE244
istex:50C061ABF98A260C4DAC73AA036B8DB984A6D1B2
ObjectType-Article-2
SourceType-Scholarly Journals-1
ObjectType-Feature-1
content type line 23
ISSN:1352-4739
1468-5876
DOI:10.1111/1468-5876.00244