Subjective probabilities and scoring rules: experimental evidence

This paper provides an articulation of the theory of scoring rules that leads to a testable hypothesis about strategic behavior under an improper rule. Subjects in a laboratory setting were first screened for linear utility in the range of rewards. Those that passed this test were used as subjects i...

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Bibliographic Details
Published inAmerican journal of agricultural economics Vol. 71; no. 2
Main Authors Nelson, R.G. (Sam Houston State University), Bessler, D.A
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published 01.05.1989
Subjects
ANALISIS ESTADISTICO
ANALYSE STATISTIQUE
CONCIENCIA SOCIAL
CONSCIENCE SOCIALE
EVALUACION
EVALUATION
INVESTIGACION
LOGICIEL
POLITICA MONETARIA
POLITIQUE MONETAIRE
PREVISION
PRISE DE DECISION
PROGRAMACION
PROGRAMAS DE ORDENADOR
PROGRAMMATION
PRONOSTICO
RECHERCHE
TOMA DE DECISIONES
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Summary:This paper provides an articulation of the theory of scoring rules that leads to a testable hypothesis about strategic behavior under an improper rule. Subjects in a laboratory setting were first screened for linear utility in the range of rewards. Those that passed this test were used as subjects in a probability forecasting experiment. Results suggest that theory holds when subjects forecast over many periods, although inexperienced subjects may fail to exploit the dominant strategy in the initial periods
Bibliography:E10
9004176
ISSN:0002-9092
DOI:10.2307/1241594