Kuhn’s Theorem for extensive form Ellsberg games

We propose the notions of mixed and behavioral Ellsberg strategies for extensive form games and prove that these strategies are outcome-equivalent if and only if mixed Ellsberg strategies satisfy a certain rectangularity condition. In addition, we show that not only the profile of Ellsberg strategie...

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Bibliographic Details
Published inJournal of mathematical economics Vol. 68; pp. 26 - 41
Main Authors Muraviev, Igor, Riedel, Frank, Sass, Linda
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published Amsterdam Elsevier B.V 01.01.2017
Elsevier Sequoia S.A
Subjects
Ellsberg games
Equilibrium
Game theory
Kuhn’s Theorem
Maxmin utility
Probability distribution
Strategic ambiguity
Studies
Kuhn’s Theorem
Maxmin utility
Ellsberg games
Strategic ambiguity
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Summary:We propose the notions of mixed and behavioral Ellsberg strategies for extensive form games and prove that these strategies are outcome-equivalent if and only if mixed Ellsberg strategies satisfy a certain rectangularity condition. In addition, we show that not only the profile of Ellsberg strategies must be appropriately chosen but also the extensive form must satisfy further restrictions beyond those implied by perfect recall in order to ensure that each player will respect his ex ante strategy choice with the evolution of play.
Bibliography:ObjectType-Article-1
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ISSN:0304-4068
1873-1538
DOI:10.1016/j.jmateco.2016.11.004