Kuhn’s Theorem for extensive form Ellsberg games
We propose the notions of mixed and behavioral Ellsberg strategies for extensive form games and prove that these strategies are outcome-equivalent if and only if mixed Ellsberg strategies satisfy a certain rectangularity condition. In addition, we show that not only the profile of Ellsberg strategie...
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Published in | Journal of mathematical economics Vol. 68; pp. 26 - 41 |
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Main Authors | , , |
Format | Journal Article |
Language | English |
Published |
Amsterdam
Elsevier B.V
01.01.2017
Elsevier Sequoia S.A |
Subjects | |
Online Access | Get full text |
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Summary: | We propose the notions of mixed and behavioral Ellsberg strategies for extensive form games and prove that these strategies are outcome-equivalent if and only if mixed Ellsberg strategies satisfy a certain rectangularity condition. In addition, we show that not only the profile of Ellsberg strategies must be appropriately chosen but also the extensive form must satisfy further restrictions beyond those implied by perfect recall in order to ensure that each player will respect his ex ante strategy choice with the evolution of play. |
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Bibliography: | ObjectType-Article-1 SourceType-Scholarly Journals-1 ObjectType-Feature-2 content type line 23 |
ISSN: | 0304-4068 1873-1538 |
DOI: | 10.1016/j.jmateco.2016.11.004 |