Dynamic Evolutionary Games and Coordination of Multiple Recycling Channels considering Online Recovery Platform

• Published in: Discrete dynamics in nature and society Vol. 2021; pp. 1 - 17
• Main Authors: Zhu, Meihong, Li, Xiao, Zhu, Liqing, Zhan, Xueli, Ma, Junhai
• Format: Journal Article
• Language: English
• Published: New York Hindawi 2021; John Wiley & Sons, Inc; Hindawi Limited; Wiley
• Subjects: Adaptive control; Chaos theory; China; Consumer goods; Consumers; Control methods; Control systems; Decision making; Electric appliances; Electronic equipment and supplies; Evolution; Home appliances; Household appliances; Households; Information technology; Internet; Limited liability companies; Logistics; Manufacturers; Mathematical models; Numerical analysis; Pricing; Profits; Recycling; Recycling (Waste, etc.); Retail stores; Supply chains; Sustainable development; Video equipment; China
• ISSN: 1026-0226; 1607-887X
• DOI: 10.1155/2021/9976157

Nowadays, with a great number of household electrical appliances being discarded in every corner of the world every day, household electrical appliances recycling is attracting more attention. In this paper, we build a closed-loop supply chain that consists of a manufacturer and a third-party recycler based on the development of “Internet Plus” recovery platform. We thoroughly analyze the model and its evolution by chaos theory, complex dynamics theory, and numerical simulation and introduce the adaptive method to control the chaos of the system. We find that as the manufacturer increases the retail price, the stable area of the market becomes smaller. At the same time, when the manufacturers direct recycle price or the price adjustment range of the products recycled from the third party exceeds a certain threshold, all the recycle prices in the whole market will fluctuate, thus causing market chaos. Among them, as an adjustment decision method, delay strategy reduces the volatility of recycle price and makes it return to a stable state, which is an effective method to control system disorder. In addition, the third-party recycler will change the optimal subsidy model according to the government’s price subsidy level, while the manufacturer always prefers the price subsidy model.