JUSTICE FOR FOXES

Ronald Dworkin maintains that value is unitary, in the sense that different values do not conflict. This article resists this 'hedgehog' view with reference to the values of equality and utility. These appear to yield conflicting prescriptions in cases where one possible distribution gives...

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Bibliographic Details
Published inLaw and philosophy Vol. 34; no. 6; pp. 633 - 659
Main Author KNIGHT, CARL
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published Dordrecht Springer 01.11.2015
Springer Netherlands
Subjects
Ethics
Law
Law and Criminology
Legal History
Philosophy of Law
Political Philosophy
Theories of Law
Luck Egalitarian
Moral Concept
Equal Concern
Unequal Distribution
Welfare Level
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Summary:Ronald Dworkin maintains that value is unitary, in the sense that different values do not conflict. This article resists this 'hedgehog' view with reference to the values of equality and utility. These appear to yield conflicting prescriptions in cases where one possible distribution gives different individuals the same amount of advantage, and the other contains an unequal distribution of a greater overall amount of advantage. Hedgehogs might respond to such a case in two ways. First, they might claim that equality and utility are not truly in conflict. However, this claim seems implausible on our ordinary concepts of these values, and Dworkin does not provide grounds for revising our concepts. Second, they might deny that one of these values – utility – is a genuine value. However, one of the two aspects of Dworkin's fundamental principle of equal concern appears to be supportive of utility, and he offers no good arguments for his preferred strategy of accommodating this aspect of equal concern within the value of equality. Furthermore, the alternative 'fox' view, which recognizes equality and utility as conflicting values, each accommodating one aspect of equal concern, has the advantage that it stays truer to familiar moral concepts.
ISSN:0167-5249
1573-0522
DOI:10.1007/s10982-015-9237-x