Aggregation and Representation in European Parliament Party Groups
While members of the European Parliament are elected in national constituencies, their votes are determined by the aggregation of MEPs in multinational party groups. The uncoordinated aggregation of national party programmes in multinational EP party groups challenges theories of representation base...
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Published in | West European politics Vol. 36; no. 3; pp. 474 - 497 |
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Main Authors | , |
Format | Journal Article |
Language | English |
Published |
London
Routledge
01.05.2013
Taylor & Francis Ltd |
Subjects | |
Online Access | Get full text |
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Summary: | While members of the European Parliament are elected in national constituencies, their votes are determined by the aggregation of MEPs in multinational party groups. The uncoordinated aggregation of national party programmes in multinational EP party groups challenges theories of representation based on national parties and parliaments. This article provides a theoretical means of understanding representation by linking the aggregation of dozens of national party programmes in different EP party groups to the aggregation of groups to produce the parliamentary majority needed to enact policies. Drawing on an original data source of national party programmes, the EU Profiler, the article shows that the EP majorities created by aggregating MEP votes in party groups are best explained by cartel theories. These give priority to strengthening the EP's collective capacity to enact policies rather than voting in accord with the programmes they were nationally elected to represent. |
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Bibliography: | ObjectType-Article-2 SourceType-Scholarly Journals-1 ObjectType-Feature-1 content type line 23 ObjectType-Article-1 ObjectType-Feature-2 |
ISSN: | 0140-2382 1743-9655 |
DOI: | 10.1080/01402382.2012.753706 |