Persuasion as a contest

• Published in: Economic theory Vol. 51; no. 2; pp. 465 - 486
• Main Authors: Skaperdas, Stergios, Vaidya, Samarth
• Format: Journal Article
• Language: English
• Published: Berlin/Heidelberg Springer 01.10.2012; Springer-Verlag; Springer Nature B.V
• Subjects: Advertising; Analysis; Audiences; Bayesian method; Campaign contributions; Costs; Decision theory; Defendants; Economic theory; Economic Theory/Quantitative Economics/Mathematical Methods; Economics; Economics and Finance; Empirical evidence; Game Theory; Guilty verdicts; Inference; Litigation; Lobbying; Lobbyists; Microeconomics; Persuasion; Plaintiffs; Political campaigns; Probability; Probability distribution; Production functions; Property rights; Public Finance; Rent seeking behavior; Rent-seeking; Social and Behav. Sciences; Social sciences; Studies; Success; Symposium; Verdicts; Political campaigning; D20; Litigation; Property rights; Rent-seeking; D70; Advertising; C70
• ISSN: 0938-2259; 1432-0479
• DOI: 10.1007/s00199-009-0497-2

We examine how the probability of persuading an audience depends on resources expended by contending parties as well as on other factors. We use a Bayesian approach whereby the audience makes inferences solely based on the evidence produced by the contestants. We find conditions that yield the well-known additive contest success function, including the logit function. We also find conditions that produce a generalized "difference" functional form. In all cases, there are three main determinants of audience choice: (i) the truth and other objective parameters of the environment; (ii) the biases of the audience, and (iii) the resources expended by the interested parties.