Moonlighting Politicians: A Survey and Research Agenda

Elected representatives in many countries are legally allowed to carry out (un)paid jobs in addition to their political mandate, often referred to as 'moonlighting'. Despite the important selection and incentive effects such outside positions might engender, academic studies evaluating the...

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Bibliographic Details
Published inJournal of legislative studies Vol. 19; no. 1; pp. 76 - 97
Main Authors Geys, Benny, Mause, Karsten
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published Routledge 01.03.2013
Subjects
disclosure rules
Electoral mandates
Electoral systems
Incentives
Legislature
Moonlighting
outside income
outside interests
Politicians
Restriction
shirking
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Summary:Elected representatives in many countries are legally allowed to carry out (un)paid jobs in addition to their political mandate, often referred to as 'moonlighting'. Despite the important selection and incentive effects such outside positions might engender, academic studies evaluating the prevalence, desirability and/or consequences of politicians' moonlighting have remained relatively scarce; often due to severe data restrictions. In recent years, however, more stringent disclosure rules have increased data availability, and large-sample analyses are becoming increasingly feasible. Besides surveying recent empirical contributions to this developing research field, this paper also outlines unresolved issues and thereby develops an agenda for future enquiry.
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ISSN:1357-2334
1743-9337
DOI:10.1080/13572334.2013.737158